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The True Colors of Trademark Law:
Greenlighting a Red Tide of Anti Competition Blues
Ann Bartow'
INTRODUCTION

T

elevation of color to stand-alone trademark status illustrates the
unbounded nature of trademarks within the judicial consciousness.
The availability of color-alone marks also facilitates the commoditization
of color in ways that complicate the development and distribution of
products and services that use color for multiple purposes conterminously.
The economic case for color-alone trademarks is severely undermined
by careful observation of the ways that colors are actually deployed in
commerce, which makes it clear that the trademarks of multiple goods and
services can utilize the same color to telegraph the same message without
confusing anyone or diluting the commercial power of textual or symbolic
trademarks.
Trademark law can be used to monopolistically harness the aesthetic
appeal or preexisting social meaning of a color. The Supreme Court was
wrong to facilitate this abuse of trademark powers when it decided in
Qualitexv.JacobsonProductsCo. that colors alone could constitute protectable
trademarks! Long ago the Supreme Court held in the Sears, Roebuck &
Co. v Stiffel Co.3 and Compco Corp. v. Day-BriteLighting, Inc.4 cases that the
Intellectual Property Clause of the Constitution preserves a right to copy
any product feature that is unrestricted by patents or copyrights., Ruling
HE

i Professor of Law, University of South Carolina School of Law. This Article benefited
greatly from the Property, Citizenship, and Social Entrepreneurship (PCSE) Workshop
on Comparative, Transnational and Emerging Issues in Property Law at the University of
Durham, the University of Ottawa Law & Technology Speakers Series, and the 2oo8 Chicago
IP Scholars Colloquium.The author would like to thank the following people for helpful input:
Funmi Arewa, Dan Burk, Lisa Dolak, Christine Farley, Brett Frischmann, Michael Froomkin,
Shubha Ghosh, Llew Gibbons, Sarah Harding, Cynthia Ho, Tim Holbrook, Ian Kerr, Jaqui
Lipton, Robin Malloy, Peggy Radin, Sharon Sandeen, and Diane Leenheer Zimmerman. This
Article is dedicated to Casey Bartow-McKenney and Thelma Adams.
2 Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 161 (1995).
3 Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
4 Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
5 See generally U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; David E. Shipley, What Do Flexible Road Signs,
Children's Clothes and the Allied Campaign in Europe During WWII Have In Common? The Public
Domain andthe Supreme Court's Intellectual Property Jurisprudence, 13 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J.
57 (2oo5).
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in favor of color-alone trademarks abrogated this important principle for
no good reason. The Qualitex holding did not lessen color related consumer
confusion, because there was not evidence of any. Instead it reduced
competition and consumer choice by creating illegitimate aesthetic and
communicative cartels.
The primary doctrinal arguments against recognizing color-alone
trademarks raised here include aesthetic functionality, the related concept
of communicative functionality, uncertainty about scope, and color
exhaustion. Colors always add aesthetic value, and often communicate
messages unrelated to commercial source. Coupled with the uncertainties
related to color-alone marks and the risks of color exhaustion, the
anticompetitive effects of color monopolies outweigh any possible social
benefit from a regime that permits registration of color-alone trademarks.
It is further argued that if any court attempted to declare a color "famous"
for dilution purposes, thereby granting a commercial entity broad rights
to monopolize the color well beyond the context in which it is used in
commerce, there would be a furious backlash against this ill-advised
doctrine. The palette of commercially appealing colors is far more limited
than the dictionary of attractive and usable words, and could be radically
depleted by deployment of dilution precepts rather quickly. Courts that
recognize this may relegate color-alone marks to some second class status
that is ineligible for dilution protections, preserving color availability
somewhat but further warping trademark doctrine.
I. COLOR MARKS AND THEIR DISCONTENTS

Congress never made a principled inquiry into the desirability of coloralone trademarks. The decision to recognize colors alone as protectable,
defensible trademarks is an iconic example of reflexive expansion of
trademark rights by members of the judiciary. There is a robust presumption
among many judges that any signifier can be a trademark if consumers can
be manipulated into connecting it with a unitary source, even if the name
and nature of the source itself are unknown. At first blush, this appears
to give corporations expansive liberties to devise diverse and creative
trademarks with which to communicate with consumers. It is, however,
a false freedom of corporate speech. Valid trademarks must be chosen or
developed outside of the boundaries of established trademarks held by
competitors. Because the scope of trademark rights expands beyond the
literal marks into the indeterminate realm of the confusingly similar, or
potentially dilutive, these boundaries are fluid. To avoid drowning in them,
the construction of a new, enforceable, non-infringing trademark requires
some modicum of originality vis-A-vis preexisting marks, especially the
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marks of similar or related products or services. 6 The words, symbols,
and colors used by competitors to mark competing goods or services are
best avoided as widely as possible from a legal standpoint, but some mark
attributes are so irresistible from a marketing perspective that an entity is
willing to risk trademark litigation. In other instances, the practical scope
of a mark used by a competitor can be ambiguous and difficult to discern,
leading to unexpected litigation.
A. The Limitations of a Linguistic Palette
Some types of signifiers are simply better suited to serving as
simultaneously effective and distinctive trademarks than others. Words,
alone or grouped as phrases or slogans, can be transmitted and recreated
by writers and speakers with a high degree of faithfulness. Symbols can
be visually communicated where circumstances allow or reproduced with
drawings or described by words where access to a copy of the mark itself
is not available, though some diminution in accuracy might be expected
where humans reproduce the marks from memory or by hand. Sounds
can be aurally conveyed using sound transmitting technologies, or via
simple singing, humming, or instrumental improvisation as necessary, with
attendant tonal and lyrical imprecisions.
Smells, however, present descriptive challenges. Odor based marks
can be textually described (e.g., sewing thread with "a high impact, fresh,
floral fragrance reminiscent of Plumeria blossoms"7 ), but aromas can be
difficult to efficiently reproduce. Unless the scented product or package or
a reasonable facsimile is available, the metes and bounds of a trademarked
stench are conceptually amorphous. Two people might agree that their
noses detect the fragrance of baking bread, or the stink of rotting fruit,
but beyond these general descriptions, reducing an airborne bouquet to
language is tricky.
Beyond obvious umbrella designations like "red" or "blue," colors can
also be difficult to accurately convey in words and challenging to casually
reproduce. Yellow can mean sunflower petals, egg yolks, legal paper, or
lemons. Referencing "the color of grass" does a poor job of telegraphing
a precise shade of green. Even when two people are staring at the same

6 E.g., Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Death of Ontology: A TeleologicalApproach to Trademark
Law, 84 IowA L. REv. 611, 736 (1999) ("In the context of trademark law, the test of consumer
confusion is only partly within the competitor's control. She cannot foreclose a claim through
independent creation, but she can limit potential liability through clear differentiation of
source in packaging and marketing.").
7 Clarke, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1238, 1238 (TTA.B. 199o).
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object, they may perceive its color somewhat differently,8 as eyes and brains
process colors contextually and with surprising ambiguity.9
Like odors, colors alone can legally function as trademarks if they
are deemed to reflect an established but nonfunctional semiotic link
0
between the color and the source of the color-bearing goods or services.'
Occasionally, color alone will be used in an advertisement, or on product
packaging. However, rare indeed is the company that relies solely on color
alone to consistently identify its products in the stream of commerce,
without a companion symbol or textual mark. This author was unable to
come up with a single example.
The Qualitex company may be able to protect green-gold as a coloralone trademark but it never uses green-gold alone as a sole trademark. It
marks its products with the words "Qualitex" and "Sun Glow" and these
textual marks act as the primary source identifiers."' Without a companion
textual mark or a unique symbol, it is doubtful that green-gold could
effectively serve as a source identifier at all. Many corporations are happy
to register and protect color-alone trademarks, but they do not use them as
stand-alone trademarks.
Color is most commonly and effectively used in conjunction with textual
marks. Color marks often are pragmatically valued by holders because they
provide mechanisms for commercially disadvantaging competitors. This is
a misuse, and indeed an abuse, of trademark power.
Commercial actors don't use color-alone marks alone for the same
reason the Court was wrong to deem colors alone protectable marks: most
people do not view colors alone as independent source identifiers. Color

8 See Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Beautone Specialties Co., 82 F. Supp. 2d 997, ioo (D.
Minn. 2000)(noting term "canary yellow" could encompass a broad range of color).
9 See Austen Clark, Qualia and the Psychophysiological Explanation of Color Perception,
65 SYNTHESE 377, 377 (1985), available at http://www.ucc.uconn.edu/-wwwphilliooks.html
("A neutral grey patch enclosed in a green surround looks somewhat red. It presents the
appearance of a reddish grey, even though when one blocks the surround, one can see that
the patch is not reddish at all, but merely grey. Furthermore, the same grey patch with a red
surround will look somewhat green.") (emphasis in original); see also Etienne Benson, Different
Shades of Perception, MONITOR ON PSYCHOL., Dec. 2002, at 28, available at http://www.apa.org/
monitor/deco2/perception.html; Robert W. Burnham, Inter-Eye Differences in Color-Perception,
70 AM. J. PSYCHOL. 386 (1957); John Campbell, Transparency vs. Revelation in Color Perception,
33 PHIL. Topics Io5 (zoo5), available at http:/lsocrates.berkeley.edul-jcampbel/documentsl
Color-PhilTopics.pdf; Anna Franklin et al., Categorical Perception of Color Is Lateralized to
the Right Hemisphere in Infants, but to the Left Hemisphere in Adults, 105 PROC. NAT'L AcAD. Sci.
3221 (zoo8), available at http://www.pnas.org/cgilcontentlabstractl105/9/322l; Munsell Color
Science Laboratory, Perception FAQ, http:l/www.cis.rit.edu/mcslloutreachlfaq.php?catnum= I
(last visited Apr. I, zoo8); Color Perception, http:l/wwwcs.uni-paderborn.de/cslag-domikstaticlarbeitsschwerpunkte/ucmmlidias/umlabilirylexpscpe.htm (last visited Apr. I,2oo8).
Io Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 161 (1995).
II See Qualitex, Sun Glow Press Pads, http:l/www.qualitexco.com/http/pads.html (last
visited Mar. 20, 2008).
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marks are simply unable to perform as inherently distinctive trademarks,
as the Supreme Court noted in Qualitex.12 By failing to deploy colors alone
as sole trademarks, manufacturers and distributors behave as if they cannot
be trusted to be singularly distinctive at all.
Mark holders typically use word marks in tandem with colors because
language facilitates certainty in ways that are useful for commerce. Color
marks are secondary and generally play supporting roles to dominant
textual marks. This sometimes means that, in addition to marking products,
product names also identify trademarked tints and shades: "Tiffany blue," 3
"UPS brown,"'14 "Pepto Bismol pink," 5 and "Yellow Cab yellow"' 6 may all
be familiar to the reader. "Kimberly-Clark orange" is probably a bit more
obscure, unless one has reason to be familiar with disposable medical
facemasks.' 7
Colors have multiple social meanings. In South Carolina, orange means
Clemson University, 8 while in Tennessee, it signifies an allegiance with
the University of Tennessee Volunteers.' 9 If an observer saw a truck that
was bright yellow from end to end, without a single textual indicator, she
12 Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 162-63 ("True, a product's color is unlike 'fanciful,' 'arbitrary,'
or 'suggestive' words or designs which almost automatically tell a customer that they refer
to a brand ....
But over time customers may come to treat a particular color on a product or
its packaging (say, a color that in context seems unusual, such as pink on a firm's insulating
material or red on the head of a large industrial bolt) as signifying a brand .... Again, one might
ask, if trademark law permits a descriptive word with secondary meaning to act as a mark, why
would it not permit a color, under similar circumstances, to do the same? We cannot find in the
basic objectives of trademark law any obvious theoretical objection to the use of color alone
as a trademark, where that color has attained 'secondary meaning' and therefore identifies and
distinguishes a particular brand (and this indicates its 'source')."); see also Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 211-12 (2000).
13 SeeTiffany & Co., http://www.tiffany.com (last visited Apr. 1,2o08).
14 UPS registered the color brown for the vehicles and uniforms used for its transportation
and delivery services. See, e.g., Press Release, UPS, UPS Launches Biggest, "Brownest" Ad
Campaign Ever (Feb. 7, 2002), available at http://www.pressroom.ups.comlpressreleases/
archives/archive/o, 1363,391 7,oo.html; UPS, UPS Pressroom: UPS Brownie Points, http://www.
pressroom.ups.com/mediakits/factsheet/o,23o5, i 16o,oo.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2008).
15 See Pepto Bismol, http://www.pepto-bismol.com/ (last visited Mar. 20, 2008).
16 See Yellow Cab Co. of Sacramento v. Yellow Cab of Elk Grove, Inc., 49 F3d 925 (9th
Cir. 2005).

17 See Court Protects Kimberly Clarke Trademark Orange Color, IPFRONTLINE, Nov. 10, 2006,
http://www.ipfrontline.comldepts/article.asp?id= 1329o&deptid=7.
I8 See Clemson University, http://www.clemson.edu (last visited Mar. 20,2008). Clemson
University is a public school in South Carolina that is far inferior to the University of South
Carolina in every way, including but not limited to, the fact that it does not have an associated
law school. See Clemson University Home Page, http://www.clemson.edu/ (last visited March
20, 2oo8) (This is a tongue in cheek assessment meant to tweak the University of South
Carolina's fiercest in-state rival, which, for a University that lacks a law school, is actually a
surprisingly excellent school.).
19 See University of Tennessee, Knoxville, http://www.utk.edu (last visited Mar. 20,
2oo8).
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might recognize this as a Ryder/Hertz-Penske truck. Or she might assume
the vehicle was part of the Yellow Freight fleet. Or she might think that it
was simply painted yellow because someone felt this was a cheerful color
for a truck.
If a trucking company used a yellow sun symbol as its trademark, it is
easy to understand that consumers would likely be confused if a competing
company adopted a yellow sun icon as well, and both marks were employed
on the sides of trucks. But the same would not be true if the competitor
adopted a yellow squiggle, or a yellow steering wheel icon, or a yellow house
pictogram, or a two-dimensional bouquet of yellow daisies or buttercups.
Colors can make symbols more distinctive, but alone they signify too many
things to function as effective trademarks.
It is true that with enough exposure via relentless advertising and
expansive market permeation, any color can be linked with a product
or a company in consumers' minds. This is not, however, an adequate
justification for allowing commercial entities to monopolize particular
colors through trademark law. Mere association does not mean a color is
functioning as a trademark.20 And there can be no trademark protection
when a color has a function,2 ' which it always will when it is a product
feature.
Companies are not allowed to register or protect generic terms as
trademarks for the goods or services they identify, even if the company
can make an evidentiary showing of secondary meaning as a result of
market dominance. 2 For example, a huge proportion of the computerowning populace may associate the acronym DOS (which stands for Disk
Operating System) with Microsoft due to that company's tremendous
commercial success with its software, but, as a doctrinal matter, Microsoft
should not be able to claim DOS alone as a trademark for the disc operating
systems it markets. While MS-DOS can be and is a protectable trademark
zo Mere association is sometimes characterized as "de facto secondary meaning," which
is secondary meaning to which the law attaches no legal significance. See Boston Beer Co. L.P.,
198 F3d 1370, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1999); see also Application of Sun Oil Co., 426 F.zd 401 (C.C.P.A.
1970); Audio Fidelity Inc. v. London Records, Inc., 332 F.zd 577 (C.C.P.A. I964). Cf. Moseley v.
V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418,434 (2003) ("'Blurring' is not a necessary consequence
of mental association. (Nor, for that matter, is 'tarnishing.')").
21 See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 168-69 (1995) (citing In re
Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 774 F.zd is 16, 1121 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).
22 See, e.g., U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, Trademark FAQ: Can the Office Refuse
to Register a Mark, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/tac/tmfaq.htm (follow "Can the office
refuse to register a mark?" hyperlink under "Application Process") (last visited Apr. 2, 2008)
("Not all words, names, symbols or devices function as trademarks. For example, matter
which is merely the generic name of the goods on which it is used cannot be registered.");
International Trademark Association, Trademarks vs. Generic Terms, http://www.inta.org
(follow "Information & Publishing" hyperlink; then follow "Basic Trademark Information"
hyperlink; then follow "Trademarks vs GenericTerms" hyperlink under "Types of Protection")
(last visited Apr. 2, 2oo8).
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for the company, 3 other software companies are free to use DOS to
describe the disc operating systems that they produce. The rationale is that
no manufacturer or service provider should be given an exclusive right to
use words that generically identify a product or service. 4 Neither should
trademark law grant an exclusive right to a color that plays aesthetic or
communicative roles.
B. All the Colors of the Rainbow
Green-gold became the unassailably, federally registered trademarked
color of Qualitex dry-cleaning pads via a Supreme Court case."5 The Court
resolved a circuit split over whether a color could be accorded stand-alone
trademark status, even though this particular mark never actually stands
alone in commerce. The color is instead linked and duly subservient to the
words "Qualitex" and "Sun Gold," especially at the point of sale. Although
in Qualitex the Court held that colors alone can serve as trademarks,
23 See, e.g., Microsoft Corp., Trademarks, http://support.microsoft.com/library/toolbar/ .o/
3
trademarks/en-us.mspx (last visited Apr. 2, zoo8).
24 See U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, Trademark FAQ, http://www.uspto.gov/web/
offices/tac/tmfaq.htm. The Ninth Circuit in its Model Civil Jury Instructions, defines "generic
marks" as follows:

Generic Marks. The fourth category of trademarks is entitled to no
protection at all. They are called generic trademarks and they give
the general name of the product of the plaintiff. They are part of our
common language that we need to identify all such similar products.
They are the common name for the product to which they are affixed.
It is the general name for which the particular product or service is an
example.
It is generic if the term answers the question "what is the product being
sold?" If the average [relevant] consumer would identify the term with
all such similar products, regardless of the [manufacturer] [provider], the
term is generic and not entitled to protection as a trademark.
Clearly, the word apple can be used in a generic way and not be entitled
to any trademark protection. This occurs when the word is used to
identify the fleshy, red fruit from any apple tree.
The computer maker who uses that same word to identify the personal
computer, or the vitamin maker who uses that word on vitamins, has no
claim for trademark infringement against the grocer who used that same
word to indicate the fruit sold in a store. As used by the grocer, the word
is generic and does not indicate any particular source of the product. As
applied to the fruit, "apple" is simply the common name for what it is
that is being sold.
9TH CIR. JURY INSTR. § 15.17 (Ninth Cir. Jury Instr. Comm. 2007).
25 Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 159.
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commercial vendors have been deeply reluctant to put this legal theory
into commercial practice. None of the cases that comprise color-alone
jurisprudence involved color alone uses of color-alone trademarks.
In 1985, a Federal Circuit opinion 6 accorded trademark status to
the color pink when it is used as a source identifier in Owens-Corning
fiberglass building insulation. 7 The backing paper of the insulation bore
the trademarked words "Owens Corning," but the court was convinced
that consumers independently recognized the pink color as a signifier of
source and that trademark law allowed Owens Corning to leverage this
accrued recognition into a limited monopoly. Other fiberglass insulation
manufacturers were free to inject alternative colors into their products, but
pink insulation became Owens Corning's exclusive prerogative.
In 1990, the Seventh Circuit contrarily refused a vendor of sugar
substitutes trademark rights to the color blue itself, stating that blue
packaging "used in connection with some symbol or design or impressed8
in a particular design" was adequate color-linked trademark protection.
In 1993, however, the Eighth Circuit rejected this limiting principle and
saw no reason that the color blue could not function as a fully protectable
(in a trademark sense) source identifier for the Blue Max brand of splicing
tape. 9 This decision widened the circuit split on this judicially contested
issue enough to attract the Supreme Court's certiorari-granting attention.
In 1995, the Supreme Court held in Qualitex that "[slince human beings
might use as a 'symbol' or 'device' almost anything at all that is capable
of carrying meaning," a correct reading of the Lanham Act's definition of
a trademark as "any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination
3
thereof' 30 was both literal and liberal. ' This opinion went on to observe
that "[tihe courts and the Patent and Trademark Office [had previously]
authorized" shapes, sounds, and scents for use as marks, in addition to more
3
mundane and commonplace words and pictorial designs. Colors, the Court
decided, could reasonably serve as marks as well once they had attained
acquired distinctiveness (also known as secondary meaning), as long as their
use was nonfunctional.3 3The Court framed the question presented as "why
not?" 3 and arguably adapted the modern articulation of patentable subject

Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 774 F2d 1116, 1128 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
http://www.owenscorning.com/around/insulation/
Owens-Corning,
e.g.,
See,
insulationhome.asp (last visited Mar. 20, 2008).
28 NutraSweet Co. v. Stadt Corp., 917 F2d 1024, 1027 (7th Cir. 199o).
29 Master Distrib., Inc. v. Pako Corp., 986 F.2d 219, 224 (8th Cit. 1993).
30 Lanham Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000).
31 Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 162 (1995).
26

27

Id.
33 Id. at 163-65.
34 Id. at 162.

32
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matter to trademarks: "Anything under the sun, perceived by man. '35
It is the position of this author that the Qualitex case was wrongly
decided. It is endemically problematic because the opinion resulted in
de facto lawmaking that expanded the scope of trademark law without
adequately considering the competitive functional roles that product
design features, like color, play. Though amicus briefs expanded the
doctrinal and practical issues to an extent, the Court had full information
about only one particular trademark dispute at its disposal when it decided
to render colors alone legally protectable trademarks. Important issues and
evidence related to color-alone trademarks were not raised by the parties,
who had no obligation or incentive to present information unrelated to their
specific claims, nor were these concerns raised by amici. Therefore, the
Court apparently did not consider actual trademark uses and practices in
commerce, or the commercial reasons marks are deployed or not deployed
in various contexts when it endorsed the concept of free-floating, coloralone trademarks in Qualitex. This led to poorly informed, and ill-advised
judicial lawmaking in this case.
II. FUNCTIONALITY

A. The Functionalityof Color
The Lanham Act makes it clear that functional attributes cannot be
protected as trademarks even if these are otherwise source identifying.3 6As
Graeme Dinwoodie has observed:
[T]rademark protection should depend upon whether the particular
35 35 U.S.C.

§

101 (20OO).

36 See Lanham Act § 2(e)(5), 15 U.S.C.A. § 1052(e)(5) (Supp. zoo8) ("No trademark by

which the goods of the applicant may be distinguished from the goods of others shall be refused
registration on the principal register on account of its nature unless it-...
(e)(5) comprises
any matter that, as awhole, is functional."); Lanham Act § 14(3), 15 U.S.C.A. § io64(3) (Supp.
2oo8) ("A petition to cancel a registration of a mark, stating the grounds relied upon, may,
upon payment of the prescribed fee, be filed ... [alt
any time if the registered mark becomes
the generic name for the goods or services, or a portion thereof, for which it is registered, or is
functional ....
");Lanham Act § 23(c), 15 U.S.C. § 1091(c) (Supp. 2005) ("For the purposes of
registration on the supplemental register, a mark may consist of any trademark, symbol, label,
package, configuration of goods, name, word, slogan, phrase, surname, geographical name,
numeral, device, any matter that as a whole is not functional ....); Lanham Act § 33(8), 15
U.S.C. § 1115(8) (Supp. zoo5) ("Registration as evidence of right to exclusive use; defenses..
. [t]hat the mark is functional."); Lanham Act § 43(a)(3), 15 U.S.C.A. § II25(a)(3) (Supp. zoo8)
("In a civil action for trade dress infringement under this chapter for trade dress not registered
on the principal register, the person who asserts trade dress protection has the burden of
proving that the matter sought to be protected is not functional."); i5U.S.C.A. § I I25(c)(4)(A)
("In a civil action for trade dress dilution under this Chapter for trade dress not registered on
the principal register, the person who asserts trade dress protection has the burden of proving
that-... the claimed trade dress, taken as a whole, is not functional and is famous.").
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symbolic matter identifies the source of a product (i.e., whether the matter is
"distinctive"), and upon whether protection of the particular symbol would
effective competition
accord the producer a practical monopoly and prevent
37
by others (i.e., whether the matter is "functional").
A valid mark must be nonfunctional as well as source identifying.3" The
functionality test articulated by the Supreme Court is whether "exclusive
use of the [product] feature would put competitors at a significant nonreputation-related disadvantage."39 The Court seemed unconcerned
that allowing color-alone trademarks meant that competitors would be
precluded from producing products in colors that consumers preferred to
purchase for aesthetic reasons. Justice Breyer wrote:
Although sometimes color plays an important role (unrelated to source
identification) in making a product more desirable, sometimes it does not.
And, this latter fact - the fact that sometimes color is not essential to a
product's use or purpose and does not affect cost or quality - indicates that
the doctrine of "functionality" does not create an absolute bar to the use of
color alone as a mark.'
Colors used in relation to goods or services are employed either
arbitrarily, or functionally, or both. For many consumer goods, color is
arbitrary. Staplers, tape dispensers and hole-punchers can be made in any
color, eye-catching or bland. Office supply manufacturers may produce
these items in a variety of colors to suit a range of tastes.
In other cases, color choices are clearly driven by function. For example,
Astroturf, a manufactured sod substitute often used on athletic fields, is
often green because it replaces and is supposed to look like grass. The color
green is therefore being used in a highly functional way. Bright orange is a
color often functionally used for visibility purposes, such as in traffic cones
and reflective vests or on clothing marketed to hunters to help them avoid
shooting each other in the woods.
In Qualitex, the Supreme Court gave little credence to the defendant's
functionality argument, not because the justices questioned the truth of
the assertion that green-gold did a good job of hiding stains on dry cleaning
pads, but because of an espoused belief that other dark colors could

37 Dinwoodie, supra note 6, at 617.
38 Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 164.
39 Id. at i65 (citing Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844,850 n. to). Qualitex
putatively restated Inwoodas articulation of the functionality test: whether a product feature
"is essential to the use or purpose of the article or if it affects the cost or quality of the article."

Id.
40 Id. at 165 (citing Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 774 E2d i 116,
1985)).

1123
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accomplish the same purpose. 41 Even though the Court acknowledged
that "it is important to use some color on press pads to avoid noticeable
stains," it endorsed the view that there was "no competitive need in the
press pad industry for the green-gold color, since other colors are equally
usable. ' 4 This was an endorsement (despite oblique protestations to the
contrary43) of the questionable principle that if a competitor could design
or work around a functional product attribute, that attribute was not
precluded from serving as a protectable trademark or trade dress element.
The Court unequivocally rejected this a doctrinally dubious precept six
years later in TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing.Displays, Inc.44 This facet of
the Qualitex opinion was also in harmony with the Court's badly reasoned
conclusion that color exhaustion was unlikely to become a problem among
dry cleaning pad producers. 45 The Justices seemed tacitly to assume that
Qualitex would continue to hold a dominant position in the dry cleaning
industry, and that the number of competitors would remain small or decline
to compete for market share based on product features like color.
B. Aesthetic Functionality
Clothing, furniture, tableware, kitchen accessories, and other consumer
goods are manufactured in various shades of green, including green-gold,
because consumers find green to be an appealing and desirable color. The
use of green in these contexts is therefore aesthetically functional. It is
also completely arbitrary, as the same manufacturers may change the colors
of their products to respond to changing tastes, and consumers may be
just as willing to purchase an item in blue or red.46 Properly construed,
41 Id. at I66. ButseeTrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 32 (2001)
("As explained in Qualitex, supra, and Inwood, supra, a feature is also functional when it is
essential to the use or purpose of the device or when it affects the cost or quality of the device.
The Qualitex decision did not purport to displace this traditional rule. Instead, it quoted the
rule as Inwoodhad set it forth. It is proper to inquire into a 'significant non-reputation-related
disadvantage' in cases of esthetic functionality, the question involved in Qualitex. Where the
design is functional under the Inwood formulation there is no need to proceed further to
consider if there is a competitive necessity for the feature. In Qualitex, by contrast, esthetic
functionality was the central question, there having been no indication that the green-gold
color of the laundry press pad had any bearing on the use or purpose of the product or its cost
or quality.").
42 Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 166 (quoting in part from Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 21
U.S.P.Q.zd (BNA) 1457, 146o (C.D. Cal. 199I), rev'd in par, 13 F3d 1297 (9th Cir. 199I), rev'd,
514 U.S. 159 (1995)).
43 Id. at 164 ("The functionality doctrine prevents trademark law,which seeks to promote
competition by protecting a firm's reputation, from instead inhibiting legitimate competition
by allowing a producer to control a useful product feature.").
44 TrafFix,532 U.S. at 35.
45 Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 166.
46 Eco Mfg. LLC. v. Honeywell Intern., Inc., 357 E3d 649, 654 (7th Circuit 2003)
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aesthetic functionality concerns should preclude color-alone trademarks
in most consumer goods. Otherwise, consumers can be forced to forgo
obtaining products in the colors they prefer, because a single company has
of low quality,
a monopoly on a color but charges high prices, offers goods
47
features.
desired
other
with
products
or fails to produce
Some courts have properly placed the importance of allowing consumers
the ability to obtain products in the colors they prefer above an entity's
desire to make exclusive use of a color. Because farmers had an aesthetic
preference for green farm equipment, and they liked their tractors to match
their trailers, one district court refused to allow the John Deere Company
to use trademark constructs to monopolize green with respect to farm
machinery. 48 Because boat owners prefer outboard motors to be black for
aesthetic reasons, the Federal Circuit ruled that a single outboard motor
company could not use trademark 49law to position itself as the exclusive
purveyor of black outboard motors.
The Qualitex company's selection of green-gold as its trademark color
probably had an element of aesthetical functionality, as the company
doubtlessly wanted dry cleaners to find Qualitex dry cleaning pads
attractive. The adoption of green-gold specifically also must have had an
element of arbitrariness, as Qualitex could have chosen green-gold from
among alternative visually pleasing, stain-hiding colors to monopolize as
a commercial signifier. It seems plausible too that Qualitex undertook
consumer preference research which ascertained that green-gold was an
aesthetically pleasing color to dry cleaning pad purchasers.
Qualitex may have obtained a color-alone trademark, but it never
uses green-gold as a trademark without appurtenant textual marks,
usually "Qualitex" and "Sun Gold." 0 This is probably because as a savvy
competitor, Qualitex recognized what the Supreme Court did not, which is
that consumers generally do not view product colors as source identifiers."'
The fact that the Qualitex company does not use green-gold as a stand
alone trademark, but simply as a product feature, is powerful evidence
that the color's market power is related to aesthetics, rather than source
identification.

("Aesthetic appeal can be functional; often we value products for their looks.").
47 SeealsoAu-Tomotive Gold, Inc. v.Volkswagen ofAmerica, Inc., 457 F3d 1o62,Io64 (9th
Circuit zoo6) (where an aesthetic product feature serves a significant non-trademark function,
the feature can not be protected as a trademark if it would stifle legitimate competition to do
so).
48 Deere & Co. v. Farmhand, Inc., 560 E Supp. 85 (S.D. Iowa 1982).
49 Brunswick Corp. v. British Seagull Ltd., 35 Fd 1527 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
50 See Qualitex, http://www.qualitexco.com (last visited Oct. 10, 2008).
51 See, e.g., Jerome Gilson & Anne Gilson LaLonde, Cinnamon Buns, MarchingDucks and
Cherry-Scented Racecar Exhaust: ProtectingNontraditionalTrademarks, 95 TiADEMARK REP.773,
774-77 (zoo5).
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In its Qualitex opinion, the Court clearly viewed the trademark
prerogatives of manufacturers as more important than the aesthetic
preferences of consumers. Using the example of purple industrial bolts,
Justice Breyer solicitously observed:
One can understand why a firm might find it difficult to place a usable
symbol or word on a product (say, a large industrial bolt that customers
normally see from a distance); and, in such instances, a firm might want to
use color, pure and simple, instead of color as part of a design."2
Justice Breyer's assumption that customers of industrial bolts normally
only see the bolts they purchase from a distance is somewhat questionable.
Passersby and bystanders might only see the bolts from afar, but few courts
ascribe passersby and bystanders important roles in driving trademark
law.5 3 Actual purchasers of industrial bolts probably conduct significant
research into the performance-based features of bolts before buying any.
Hopefully they do, anyway, given the potentially collapsing and crumpling
consequences of utilizing inferior bolts in a structure.
Moreover, in deciding Qualitex as it did, the Court chose to privilege
a company's desire to use trademark law to monopolize the market for,
say, purple industrial bolts, over the price and quality-oriented interests of
consumers in having the widest possible range of purple industrial bolts to
choose from, and over the commercial interests of competitors, who would
reasonably prefer to meet their customers' demands for purple industrial
bolts. At least some of those consumers might prefer purple bolts because
they found bolts in this nontraditional color aesthetically appealing.
Trademark law should not preclude competitors from copying the
uncopyrighted aesthetic attributes of a commercially successful product,'M
but in the context of color-alone marks it can, though illegitimately.
Unless the color trademark-holding manufacturer of purple industrial
bolts mounts a campaign urging consumers to focus only on the color to
the exclusion of any textual mark, no matter the strength of its acquired
distinctivess, the purpleness would probably be secondary to the linguistic
name of the bolts or the bolt manufacturer. Similarly, while insulation
purchasers may demand "the pink fiberglass stuff" from shopkeepers,
chances are the store's inventory software lists its stock of pink insulation
as "Owens Corning." Furthermore, this mark would generally be necessary
to know if one wished to make the purchase online, due to the textual basis
of most Internet related e-commerce processes.
52 Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 173-74.
53 See Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 631 E Supp. 735, 744 (S.D.N.Y
1985) (assigning "only ... limited weight" to a survey measuring public confusion in a postsale context, where there is no showing that the market surveyed would have been previously
exposed to the product of the alleged infringer).
54 See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text (discussing Sears and Compco).
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Owens Corning's trademarked pink color makes its fiberglass insulation
more aesthetically attractive, changing the natural dingy, off-white color
of the insulation to something reminiscent of cotton candy. Additionally,
to some consumers, pink might connote warmth, which in cold weather
is a positive association for fiberglass insulation. It is unclear whether,
in the absence of Owens Corning's successful pink-linked advertising
campaigns and extraordinary market share, any competitors would have
an interest in dying its fiberglass insulation products pink. It is easy to
see why use of pink by a rival company would be perceived as illegitimate
free-riding, and punished as trademark infringement. Yet it is also hard to
conceive of an alternative color that would be equally appealing. Cotton
candy comes in blue, but blue is culturally associated with cold. Yellow is
the color of sunshine, but also of urine and cowardice. Green is the color
of plant life, mold and decay. Brown is the color of dirt. The range of
marketable, aesthetically appealing colors that can be effectively embedded
in fiberglass insulation may be very limited indeed. Pink may be more
valuable as a product attribute than as a trademark, in which case allowing
its monopolization is doctrinally problematic.
The fact that the color pink may be source identifying with respect
to fiberglass insulation does not trump or even mitigate its aesthetic
functionality. Consumers may recognize that pink insulation is marketed
exclusively by Owens Corning, but this does not mean they are purchasing
it because it is produced by Owens Corning. Their only information
about Owens Corning insulation probably comes from Owens Corning
advertisements, which they may or may not credit. They may select Owens
Corning insulation because it is pink, and the only pink insulation that can
be obtained is Owens Corning. Secondary meaning may be present, but
because the color pink is aesthetically functional, it is a product feature that
should not be protectable as a mark.
If consumers are buying pink insulation because it is manufactured
by Owens Corning, it seems unlikely that the pink color adds the kind of
value that Landes and Posner credit trademarks with imparting to goods
and services.5" The "Owens Corning" mark does that. The pink color
simply makes it more aesthetically appealing. Purchasers may respond
to advertising by making a mental association between the source of the
insulation and its color, but consumer motivation in reacting to the color
is due to its visual appeal?. 6 With a large marketing budget and clever

55 See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective,
30 J.L. & EcoN. 265, 268-70 (1987) (identifying the lowering of brand recognition costs to

consumers as the justification for trademark law). See generallyWILLIAM M. LANDEs & RICHARD

A. POSNER,

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAw

15-16 (2004), available

at http:l/www.aei.org/docLib/2oo4o6o8_Landes.pdf.
56 For a discussion of the inherent instability of consumer understandings of trademarks,
see Mark P McKenna, Trademark Use and the Problem of Source in Trademark Law, 2009 U. ILL.
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advertising campaign, consumers can be persuaded to mentally associate
colors with textual marks or company names. This alone is not enough to
justify awarding colors trademark status.
C. The Overprotection of the Arbitrary
Congress made functionality a barrier to enforcing all trademarks,
even if they are famous57 or have obtained incontestable status.58 As a
doctrinal matter, functional uses of color are not meant to be susceptible
to monopolization as trademarks.5 9 Nor are functional uses of color by
6
competitors properly deemed infringements of existing trademarks. 0
Functionality is a death blow to trademark protection, no matter how much
secondary meaning might link a mark and a product or service. Robust
trademark functionality is a bulwark against abuses of
judicial policing of
61
trademark power.
Within the analytical framework of trademark law, the polar opposite
of functional is "arbitrary." "Arbitrary" can be a very valuable doctrinal
designation for a trademark. Some judges believe that arbitrary marks
deserve the highest levels of trademark protection. 62 An arbitrary 6mark
3
eschews utilitarian purpose, and exudes randomness and serendipity.
Most trademark infringement adjudications require a court to make some
assessment of the strength of the plaintiff's mark. The most meaningful
L. REV. (forthcoming

2009).

57 See Lanham Act § 43, I5 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c)(2)(A) (Supp. 2008) ("IA] mark is famous if
it is widely recognized by the general consuming public of the United States as a designation
of source of the goods or services of the mark's owner.").
58 See Lanham Act § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 1o65 (zooo); Lanham Act § 16, 15 U.S.C. § 1o66
(2000); Lanham Act § 33, 15 U.S.C. § 1115 (2005).
59 Lanham Act § 2(e)(5), 15 U.S.C.A. § IO52(e)(5) (Supp. 2008) (stating that a mark
cannot be registered if it "comprises any matter that, as a whole, is functional"); see also TrafFix
Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 29 (2001) ("[Tirade dress protection may
not be claimed for product features that are functional.").
6o Section 33 of the Lanham Act acknowledges functionality as a defense to infringement
even when a plaintiff's mark has incontestable status. Lanham Act § 33(b), 15 U.S.C. §
1115(b) (2000). In Qualitex, the Supreme Court noted: "The functionality doctrine prevents
trademark law, which seeks to promote competition by protecting a firm's reputation, from
instead inhibiting legitimate competition by allowing a producer to control a useful product
feature." Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 164 (I995). See also Margreth
Barret, Consolidatingthe Diffuse Paths to Trade Dress Functionality:Encountering TrafFix on the
Way to Sears, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 79 (2004).
6I See, e.g., infra note 88 and accompanying text.
62 See, e.g., Virgin Enters. Ltd. v. Nawab, 335 F3d 141, 147 (2d Cir. 2003) ("[Tlhe law
accords broad, muscular protection to marks that are arbitrary or fanciful in relation to the
products on which they are used."). Butsee, e.g., Banfi Prods. Corp. v. Kendall-Jackson Winery,
Ltd., 74 E Supp. 2d 188, 196 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (holding that "a finding that a particular mark is
arbitrary does not guarantee a determination that the mark is strong").
63 Abercrombie & Fitch, Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 Ed 4 (2d Cir. 1976).
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type of trademark strength is the extent of consumer recognition. 64 A mark
that many consumers recognize due to heavy advertising and/or market
dominance of the marked good or service, is both strong and, because it
is commercially effective, likely to attract free riders. 61 Where the free
riding takes the form of counterfeiting, the mark holder is unequivocally
entitled to a legal remedy.66 Whether the law should intervene is a far more
complicated inquiry in cases where the free riding is alleged to be likely to
cause confusion among consumers. Where the free riding is not confusing to
consumers, but usurps ideas that are not protected by copyrights or patents,
it can be otherwise described as legitimate competition, and trademark
law should not interfere. 67 The mark holder always has non-legal options
to dispatch free-riding competitors such as providing better products,
charging lower prices, or leveraging its strong trademark with a persuasive
advertising campaign.
A second concept sometimes referred to as strength, however, has
to do with the conceptual category the trademark is assigned by a court.
The four categories a judge has to choose from are generic, descriptive,
suggestive, and arbitrary or fanciful. There are really only two distinctions
that are important. The line between generic and descriptive is critical
because while descriptive marks are protectable if the holder can show
that the mark has secondary meaning (which is sometimes referred to as
"acquired distinctiveness"), generic marks can not be protected at all. 68
The line between descriptive and suggestive is significant because the
evidentiary burden falls heavier on the holder of a descriptive mark than
it does on the holder of a suggestive mark. If its validity is challenged, the
holder of a descriptive mark must convince the judicial fact finder that
her mark has secondary meaning. This is usually accomplished in part by
submitting consumer survey evidence, which can be arduous and expensive
to compile.69 A suggestive mark, however, is presumed "inherently
distinctive" and its holder does not have to prove anything in this regard.70
A suggestive mark is therefore far cheaper and easier to defend for validity
purposes in the context of infringement litigation than a descriptive one.
64 See, e.g., 2 J. THOMAS

MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION

§ 11.74-11.75 (4th ed. 2oo8) ("One of the benefits of a strong mark.., is the owner's wellearned capacity to achieve a high degree of consumer recognition."); 2 J.T IOMAS MCCARTHY,
MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 15.o8 (4th ed. 2oo8).
65 See Kenner Parker Toys Inc. v. Rose Art Indus., Inc., 963 Fad 350, 353 (Fed. Cir.
1992).

66 See Lanham Act § 35(b)-(c), 15 U.S.C. § II 17(b)-(c) (2ooo & Supp. 2oo5).
67 See Pampered Chef, Ltd. v. Magic Kitchen, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 785, 795 (N.D.I.L.
1998).
68 15 U.S.C. § 1117; MCCARTHY, supra note 62, at § 11.25.
69 See Impreglon, Inc. v. Newco Enters., Inc., 5o8 F Supp. 2d 1222, 1240 (N.D.Ga. 2007);
6 McCARTHY, supranote 62,at § 32.195 (4th ed. 2oo8).
70 See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 5o5 U.S. 763, 774 (1992).
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The same is true of arbitrary and fanciful marks.
The line between suggestive and arbitrary or fanciful is only salient
when judges decide to accord a broader scope of protection to arbitrary or
fanciful marks. One might conclude that Congress set up the four categories
to incentivize the use of suggestive, arbitrary and fanciful trademarks, but
one would be gravely mistaken. It was the courts, rather than Congress, that
originated and instantiated the practice of sorting trademarks into categories
that implicate the evidentiary burden on mark holders and the amount of
protection they receive. All the Lanham Act requires is that valid marks be
nonfunctional, have a non-generic relationship to the associative product
or service, and establish a "secondary meaning" connection between the
mark and the product or service within the perceptions of the consuming
public.
It was judges, rather than legislators, who decided to ascribe automatic
secondary meaning to suggestive, arbitrary, and fanciful marks, thus relieving
holders of marks in these categories from the legal obligation to demonstrate
any recognition of their marks whatsoever by consumers.7 It was also the
courts that began, in a somewhat less widely followed practice," to assert that
suggestive marks were entitled to more protection than descriptive ones,
and gave arbitrary and fanciful marks even more protection than suggestive
ones.73 Although a federal registration provides a rebuttable presumption
of trademark validity, reflecting a Patent and Trademark Office examiner's
opinion that the mark is not generic,74 the registration does not provide
71 For example, see Abercrombie & Fitch, Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 Fzd 4 (2d Cir.
1976), and its pervasive aftermath, which a knowledgeable commentator referred to as one of
the worst blights on trademark law. See Beverly W. Pattishall, The Lanham Trademark Act-Its
Impact Over FourDecades, 76 TRADEMARK REP. 193, 220 (1986); see also Scandia Down Corp. v.
Euroquilt, Inc., 772 Ed 1423, 1431 n.3 (7th Cir. 1985) (criticizing use of Abercrombie & Fitch
factors in analysis of trademark strength).
72 Barton Beebe, An EmpiricalStudy of the MultifactorTestsfor Trademark Infringement, 94
CAL. L. REV. 1581, 1633-40 (2oo6).
73 The author reserves for another day a detailed interrogation of the judicially
constructed practice of according some trademarks more protection from infringement than
others. Suffice to say, in the author's view once a mark is determined to be valid, it should
have the same scope as every other protectable trademark. In addition to the foibles and
deficiencies of the categorical approach to strength, linking level of protection to consumer
recognition strength is also logically problematic. Strong marks are sometimes accorded
elevated protection because they have "earned it," but if they are well known and well
advertised, they hardly need it. The inability of most trademark holders to muster convincing
evidence of actual confusion during the course of infringement litigation, see, e.g., id. at 164o42, suggesting that rare indeed is a consumer so confused by similar trademarks or trade dress
that she cannot distinguish between national brands and their competitors. If the goals of the
Lanham Act are to foster fair competition while protecting the public from confusion, it makes
more sense to accord enhanced levels of protection to weak marks, as the lack of familiarity
that consumers have with them may create market conditions that make consumer confusion
more plausible.
74 See Lanham Act § 2(e), 15 U.S.C.A. § 1052(e) (Supp. 2oo8); Lanham Act § 7(b), 15
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any other information about what category a court might ascertain that a
mark falls into in any given context. 7" This means that competitors do not
know the strength or scope of the trademarks employed by companies they
are competing with until they find themselves defendants in trademark
infringement suits and a court rules on the categorical and/or consumer
recognition strength of the plaintiff's mark or marks at issue.
76
In terms of categorical strength, context is everything:

The word "apple" is the generic word for a particular tree-growing fruit, so
"apple" cannot be a valid trademark for apples. It is, however, an arbitrary
or fanciful trademark for computers, or for musical sound recordings, hence
Apple Computers and Apple Records. Similarly, "popcorn" is generic when
it references eponymous kernels of snack food drenched in butter and salt,
but was found suggestive when pertaining to a line of oddly shaped silver
anodes.
The word "ice" is generic for cubes of frozen water, but was held to be a
suggestive and therefore protectable mark with respect to chewing gum.
"Ice" also has been used as a trademark for beer, and in one lawsuit was
asserted to be generic by one litigant, while the mark holder claimed
that the relationship between ice and beer was "either arbitrary, fanciful
or suggestive." The keys to correctly categorizing the mark are consumer
understanding and common usage of the term at the time the issue is
presented to a court."
The categorical assignment reflects the relationship between the marked
product or service and the commercial and social meaning of the trademark
itself. To illustrate further; the word "yoghurt" would be considered generic
when used on the cultured dairy product commonly referred to as yoghurt,
and therefore ineligible for trademark use. All makers of yoghurt are free
to call their product yoghurt, because no one is able to monopolize the
word via trademark law precepts. If a hammock maker wanted to call
her product "yoghurt," for some odd reason, because there is no socially
meaningful connection between hammocks and cultured dairy products,
this trademark use would be arbitrary. It is true that any linkage in the
public consciousness between yoghurt and hammocks could be reasonably
U.S.C. § 1057(b) (2000); Jean Patou, Inc. v. Jacqueline Cochran, Inc., 2o F. Supp. 861, 864
(D.C.N.Y. 1962).
75 Nor does a trademark registration address the fact that when a mark is used for
disparate products, it can fall into multiple categories simultaneously. For example, while
Coca-Cola has been adjudicated a descriptive mark for a well known carbonated beverage, see
Coca-Cola Co. v. Deacon Brown Bottling Co., 2oo E io5 (N.D. Ala. 1912), it could reasonably be
said to be an arbitrary mark for clothing.
76 Ann Bartow, Likelihood of Confusion, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 721, 738 (20o4).
77 Id. at 743 (citations omitted).
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attributed to trademark use by the vendor, but that does not mean the mark
is or will become strong in the marketplace. If "Yoghurt Hammocks" were
widely marketed, the mark might attain consumer recognition strength. If
they were not advertised, and only a few units were sold, the mark would
be commercially weak.78
Why a categorical distinction should lead a court to provide an
evidentiary free pass, and the highest level of protection to little used
or poorly recognized marks that happen to be arbitrary or fanciful, is one
of the confounding perplexities of trademark law.79 It is contrary to the
precept that trademark holders have to earn their rights by building the
secondary meanings of their marks through advertising and distribution of
quality goods and services.
Dispensing with the requirement of evidentiary showings to prove
secondary meaning when the plaintiff's mark can be categorized as
suggestive, arbitrary, or fanciful saves courts time and effort during the
course of trademark infringement litigation, which may be at least part of
the explanation for why so many judges decided to develop and adopt this
doctrinal innovation. Why courts might also want to accord enhanced levels
of protection to suggestive marks, and higher levels of protection still to
arbitrary and fanciful marks, is a little more difficult to discern. Providing an
incentive for companies to coin fanciful trademarks makes a certain kind
of sense if one is concerned about language depletion. Suggestive and
arbitrary textual marks, however, monopolize existing words or phrases just
as readily as descriptive marks do, and even more rigorously than descriptive
marks if they are given broader swaths of protection from infringement.
Because the four iterated trademark categories are conceptualized as a
hierarchy or pyramid, s0 some judges attribute inappropriate significance to
78 In An EmpiricalStudy of the Multifactor Testsfor Trademark Infringement, Barton Beebe
asserts that trial courts weigh commercial recognition strength more heavily than categorical
strength. Beebe, supranote 70, at 1635-36.
79 Cf. id. at 1639 ("[T]he goal is [to] encourage the use of inherently distinctive rather
than descriptive marks. These are both worthy objectives.").
8o See supranote 60; see also Renaissance Greeting Cards, Inc. v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc.,
227 Fed. Appx. 239 (4th Cir. 2007); Genesee Brewing Co. v. Stroh Brewing Co., 124 F3d 137
(2d Cir. 1997); Am. Throwing Co. v. Famous Bathrobe Co., 250 F2d 377, 38t-82 (C.C.PA.
1957) ("Though the suffix 'Kins' is not as strong an indication of origin as a completely arbitrary
or coined word might be, it nonetheless is the dominant part of each of the two marks.");
Shiraz Univ. Sch. of Med. Alumni Ass'n U.S.A. v. Sheik, 99 Civ. 5126 (WHP), I999 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 11566, at * i (S.D.N.Y. July 29, 1999) ("As an arbitrary mark the Hafez gazebo is
presumptively strong."); Bridges in Orgs., Inc. v. Bureau of Nat'l Affairs, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1827, 1831 (D. Md. 1991) ("Marks that are suggestive or arbitrary are considered 'strong and
presumptively valid."'); Del Labs., Inc. v. Alleghany Pharmacal Corp., 516 F. Supp. 777, 780
(S.D.N.Y. 1981) ("[A] mark which is merely descriptive is considered to be 'weak' and cannot
be accorded trade mark protection without proof of secondary meaning whereas a mark which
is either suggestive or arbitrary is strong and presumptively valid."). But see Ignition Athletic
Performance Group, L.L.C. v. Hantz Soccer U.S.A., 245 Fed. Appx. 456, 459 (6th Cir. 2007)

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 97

trademarks that are arbitrary, especially when the mark is non-textual. Color
marks are especially susceptible to overprotection in this regard. Although
the Supreme Court observed in Qualitex that a color-alone trademark could
never be inherently distinctive,"' once secondary meaning is established,
the temptation to view colors as arbitrary would understandably be a strong
one. If the unadorned color of fiberglass insulation is offwhite, then any color
that is injected into it is arbitrary. It makes little doctrinal sense to elevate
the quantum of trademark protection this color receives above descriptive
and suggestive marks on this basis alone." The proper analytical focus is
on the strength of a mark's secondary meaning, the cognitive link between
the mark and its source. 3 Rewarding arbitrariness with higher levels of
protection'incentivizes the monopolization of colors through trademark
precepts, without offering a corresponding social benefit.
D. Communicative Functionality
Communicative functionality, which resides in the same analytic
("In assessing the strength of a mark, the trademark is placed into one of four categories, from
weakest to strongest: generic, descriptive, suggestive, and fanciful or arbitrary. The district
court correctly said that the Ignition logo is arbitrary, the strongest category of protection,
because the term 'Ignition' has nothing to do with athletic performance. However, once the
category is determined, we must analyze the mark's 'distinctiveness and degree of recognition
in the marketplace.' Though Ignition has some exposure outside of Cincinnati, it is limited,
and it did not establish any considerable strength in the Detroit market.") (citations omitted);
GOTO.COM, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 202 F3d 1199, 1207 (9th Cit. 2000) ("'[S]trength' of
conceptual strength and commercial strength.");
the trademark is evaluated in terms of its
Accuride Int'l, Inc. v. Accuride Corp., 871 F2d 1531, 1536 (9th Cir. 1989); Miss World (UK)
Ltd. v. Mrs. America Pageants, Inc., 856 F2d 1445, 1449 (9th Cit. 1988) (approving placement
on spectrum of distinctiveness as well as strength in the marketplace); Century 21 Real Estate
Corp. v. Sandlin, 846 F.zd 1175, 1179 (9th Cit. 1988) (listing factors demonstrating marketplace
strength).
81 Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 162-63 (1995) ("True, a product's
color is unlike 'fanciful,' 'arbitrary,' or 'suggestive' words or designs which almost automatically
tell a customer they refer to a brand ....But, over time, customers may come to treat a
particular color on a product or its packaging (say, a color that in context seems unusual, such
as pink on a firm's insulating material or red on the head of a large industrial bolt) as signifying
Again, one might ask, if trademark law permits a descriptive word with secondary
a brand ....
meaning to act as a mark, why would it not permit a color, under similar circumstances, to do
the same? We cannot find in the basic objectives of trademark law any obvious theoretical
objection to the use of color alone as a trademark, where that color has attained 'secondary
meaning' and therefore identifies and distinguishes a particular brand (and thus indicates its
'source')."); see also Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 211-12 (2000).
82 Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Scalia noted in Samara Brothers that the
hierarchical four category trademark taxonomy derived from Abercrombie could not be usefully
or legitimately applied to trade dress elements such as color or shape. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 212 (2ooo).
83 Rebecca Tushnet, Gone in 6o Milliseconds: Trademark Law and CognitiveScience, 86 TEX.
L. REV. 507,537 (2oo8).
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neighborhood as aesthetic functionality, is one more complicating aspect of
the use of color in commerce that ought to render color-alone trademarks
unenforceable.M4 Using colors to communicate social meanings ought to be
unfettered by trademark conventions.
Loyal alumni often wear their school colors while attending collegiate
athletic events to communicate their affinity for a particular team.
Colloquially one might accurately say that garnet and black are the
trademark colors of the University of South Carolina, but wearing these
colors to university sports events communicates support for the University
of South Carolina Gamecocks outside the linear realm of commercial
trademark use.
In Qualitex, Justice Stevens wrote that where a color serves a significant
non-trademark function, courts should examine whether its use as a
mark would permit interference "with legitimate (nontrademark-related)
competition through actual or potential exclusive use of an important
product ingredient." s" Obviously the definitions of "significant" and
"legitimate" are critical to giving this limiting principle practical meaning.
Why, if a color is serving a significant non-trademark function, it should
be protectable as a mark at all is never satisfactorily articulated, and seems
inconsistent with the functionality language in sections 2 and 14 of the
Lanham Act.
The Court did not address communicative functionality in its Qualitex
opinion, most likely because the issue was not specifically raised by Jacobson
in either its Respondent's Brief, during oral argument, or by the sole amicus
brief filed in support of Jacobson's position. 6 Yet it is at least possible that
Qualitex tries to signal a non-trademark related message through its use
of the color green. In some contexts, green is used to subtly telegraph an
ecological commitment or environmental friendliness, a message that retail
dry cleaners might desire to communicate to customers, reassuring them
that the chemicals used in dry cleaning are not harmful.
The Court's subsequent holding in TrafFix Devices suggests that once
a color is shown to serve a non-trademark function, it isn't eligible to be

84 For a discussion of the various ways consumers may use trademarks to communicate
meanings unintended by the mark holder, see generally Sonia Katyal, Semiotic Disobedience,
84 WASH. U. L. REV. (2006). See also Eduardo M. Pefialver & Sonia Katyal, Property Outlaws
(Fordham Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 90, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=745324.
85 Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 170 (1995).
86 See Transcript of Oral Argument, Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159
(1995) (No. 93-1577), i995 U.S. TRANS LEXIS 61; Brief for Respondent, Qualitex Co. v.
Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159 (1995) (No. 93-1577), 1993 U.S. Briefs 1577 (Lexis); Brief of
Private Label Manufacturers Ass'n as Amicus Curiae in Support of Affirmance of the Decision
Below, Qualitex Co. v.Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159 (1995) (No. 93-1577), i993 U.S. Briefs
1577 (Lexis).
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legally recognized as a mark at all.87 However, in the TrafFixDevices opinion,
the Court confused matters by explicitly distinguishing Qualitex as a case
about aesthetic functionality only in a way that implied that aesthetics do
not affect the marketability of a product,8 8 which is a highly questionable
conclusion. Justice Kennedy, despite the arguments about the stain-hiding
properties of green-gold by Jacobsen and without any explanation of why
aesthetics do not effect a product's "quality," rather astonishingly wrote: "In
Qualitex... esthetic functionality was the central question, there having
been no indication that the green-gold color of the laundry press pad had
s
any bearing on the use or purpose of the product or its cost or quality." 9
Apparently the TrafFix Devices Court was so committed to bolstering
the doctrinal prohibition on functional trademarks, it felt compelled to
mischaracterize the facts of Qualitex rather than admit that this opinion had
given functionality concerns short shrift.
The Court again emphasized the importance of the functionality
prohibition in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Brothers.90 Justice Scalia
wrote for a unanimous Court: "Consumers should not be deprived of the
benefits of competition with regard to the utilitarian and esthetic purposes
that product design ordinarily serves by a rule of law that facilitates
plausible threats of suit against new entrants based upon alleged inherent
distinctiveness." 9' Communication is one of the utilitarian purposes that
product design, colors particularly, can serve. Colors used in product
packaging can communicate non-source related information as well.
There are many ways to make significant, arbitrary, non-aesthetic uses
of color in commerce that are not considered trademarks or trademark
infringement. Some judicial decisions have recognized that colors can
signify a product's attributes, rather than its source. For example, in McNeil
Nutritionals,LLCv. Heartland,a district court considering a trade dress claim
held that the colors of packages of artificial sweeteners helped consumers
identify the chemical composition of the sweeteners the packages
contained. 92 It noted that Sweet'N Low made red and pink the recognized
color of saccharin, and competing house brands of saccharin reasonably used
red and/or pink packaging to communicate their chemical composition to
saccharin customers. The court observed that Equal's aggressive advertising
of its product associated aspartame with blue in the public consciousness,
so house brands of aspartame appropriately used blue packaging as well.
87 TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 32-33
88 Id. at 33.

(2001).

89 Id.
9o Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.Samara Bros., Inc.,
91 Id.at 213.

529

U.S.

205 (2000).

92 McNeil Nutritionals, L.L.C. v. Heartland Sweetners, 512 E Supp. 2d 217 (E.D. Pa.
2007), aff'd in partand rev'd in part,511 E3d 350 (3d Cir. 2007), remanded,566 F Supp. 2d 378
(E.D. Pa zoo8).
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So, the court concluded that the successful marketing of Splenda made
yellow the recognized color of sucralose, and therefore the company that
manufactured and marketed Splenda into a 60 percent market share of
artificial sweeteners could not obtain a preliminary injunction to prevent
house brands from using yellow packaging too. 93 Although the court did
not use this term, it recognized the communicative functionality of the
colors employed by sugar substitute vendors and used it as a reason to limit
trademark rights.
In Nor-Am Chemical v. O.M. Scott & Sons Co.' another district court
ruled that the blue color of fertilizer was functional because it signaled
the presence of nitrogen. In its 1982 opinion in Inwood Laboratoriesv. Ives
Laboratories,Inc.,9 the Supreme Court ruled that competitors should be
free to copy the color of a medical pill because the color communicated the
type of medication it contained, even though it might also serve sourceidentifying functions. This is another example of a court giving meaning
to the concept of communicative functionality as a limitation on trademark
rights, even if the term was not explicitly embraced.
The Hershey Company's use of brown in the wrapper of its famous
Hershey Bar, and in the packaging of so many of its other products,
communicates chocolate. Color can also communicate messages other than
product ingredients per se. Continuing in the context of candy, the color
red is associated with certain flavors: strawberry and cherry, which are as red
as the fruits are when ripened on the tree or vine, and cinnamon, which is a
far duller brown in its natural state. Red can also signal peppermint, such as
in a traditional striped candy cane, even though the peppermint leaves from
which the flavor is derived are bright green. Wintergreen flavored Lifesaver
candies, however, are white.96 Colors provide information the consumers
want (green candies are unlikely to be orange or cherry flavored) even if
it is imperfect or incomplete (green candies may be spearmint flavored, or
the color may denote lime). The interference with this communication
that can be caused by color-alone trademarks is one more argument against
having them.

93 See McNeil Nutritionals, L.L.C. v. Heartland Sweetners, 511 F.3d 350, 363 (3d Cir.
2007), remanded,566 F. Supp. 2d 378 (E.D. Pa 2oo8).
94 See Nor-Am Chem. v. O.M. Scott & Sons Co., 4 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 13 I6, 1319-2o (E.D.
Pa. 1987).
95 See Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 853, 858 n.2o (1982).
96 See Lifesavers, http://www.candystand.com/shop/shop.do?brand=lifesavers
(last
visited Mar. 26, 2oo8).

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 97

III. POTENTIAL IMPACT OF COLOR-ALONE TRADEMARKS

A. ColorExhaustion andScope Uncertainty
The Supreme Court concluded in Qualitex that concerns about color
exhaustion and uncertainty of trademark scope were outweighed by a
directive Congress embedded within the wording of the Lanham Act to
broadly construe the pool of signifiers from which federally registerable
trademarks could be drawn.97 The color exhaustion argument was an
articulation of the possibility that there would be enough companies in a
single market monopolizing color-based trademarks that all of the appealing
colors would be taken, creating a barrier to entry by additional competitors.
The uncertainty of scope argument referenced the likelihood of confusion
standard for trademark infringement suggesting that the holder of a color
trademark had a monopoly that extended beyond the registered color itself
to any similar color or shade that was likely to be confusing to some cohort
98
of the product-consuming populace.
Ambiguity about trademark scope likely hastens trademark exhaustion
by incentivizing stake claiming, homestead-like behaviors toward
color marks by commercial actors, and reasonably so. Uncertainty about
whether another shade of green would be deemed confusingly similar to
Qualitex's trademarked green-gold would cause risk-adverse competitors
to avoid every permutation of green altogether. If another dry cleaning
pad manufacturer trademarked one shade of blue, for all practical purposes
this company would then have a monopoly over a huge swath of the
blue spectrum. It wouldn't take too many color trademarks before the
use of all of the colors that customers would find attractive were chilled
by uncertainty, which in turn would synergistically exacerbate the color
exhaustion phenomena.
Jacobson raised these concerns during the Qualitex litigation, but to
no avail. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Breyer rather cavalierly
dismissed these arguments, asserting that there were large numbers of color
trademarks available for use, and if color exhaustion actually did begin to
97 A comprehensive list of Jacobson's arguments opposing Qualitex's color-alone
trademark is as follows: (i) color-alone trademarks would produce uncertainty and unresolvable
court disputes about what shades of a color a competitor may lawfully use; (2) a color-alone
regime is unworkable in light of the limited supply of colors that will soon be depleted by
competitors; (3) allowing color-alone trademarks was contrary to many older cases, including
decisions of the Supreme Court interpreting pre-Lanham Act trademark law; and (4) allowing
color-alone trademarks was unnecessary because companies could use color as components
of protectable trademarks and trade dress. See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S.
159, 166-74 (1995).
98 For a good discussion of the uncertainties associated with color trademarks see Melissa

E. Roth, Note, Something Old, Something New, Something Borrowed, Something Blue: A New
Tradition in NontraditionalTrademarkRegistrations, 27 CARDozo L. REv. 457,476-82 (2005).
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interfere with competition, the issue could be revisited in the future. He
wrote: "When a color serves as a mark, normally alternative colors will likely
be available for similar use by others." 9 In the dry cleaning pad market
niche this may have been true, but it doesn't explain why trademark law
compels competitors to use a second best color if consumers prefer greengold for aesthetic reasons.
In addition, the Qualitex Court sanguinely touted the option of revisiting
the color exhaustion issue by either successfully lobbying Congress to
amend the Lanham Act, or attempting to re-argue it all the way up to
the Supreme Court and convince nine justices to abrogate the stare
decisis doctrine'00 and overrule Qualitex, which is certainly a theoretical
possibility. Realistically, however, it would be prohibitively expensive
and far too uncertain for even a wealthy and well-established company to
undertake. Because it is probably new or hopeful market entrants that are
most negatively affected by enforceable color marks, the most motivated
objectors may well lack the resources to mount an effective campaign for
legislative or judicial change.
B. The PotentialImplosion of Trademark Dilution
When color exhaustion and scope uncertainty are mixed into a trademark
dilution dispute, the anticompetitive aspects of the doctrine are painted in
stark relief. The Qualitex Court's belief that the many visually observable
colors in the world afford an almost unbounded trademark palette did not
anticipate the limiting difficulties that the trademark dilution would soon
pose by according almost absolute trademark rights to qualifying mark
holders. The Federal Trademark Dilution Act was passed the year after
Qualitex was decided and granted the holders of famous marks expansive,
close-to-absolute rights that transcend the "use in commerce" limiting
principles of traditional trademark law. 10 Dilution powers were arguably
99 Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 168.
IO Jacobson argued that the Court would do this if it overturned the Ninth Circuit's
ruling in Qualitex. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 84, at * 13.
ioi See Lanham Act § 43(c)(1), 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c)(1) (Supp. 2oo8). The FDTA was
revised and arguably strengthened in 2oo6,see, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Schechter's Ideas in Historical
Context andDilution's Rocky Road, 24 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L. J. 469 (2008);
Robert G. Bone, A Skeptical View of the Trademark Dilution Revision Act, INTELL. PROP. L. BULL.
187 (2007). On the problems with dilution, see generally Christine Haight Farley, Trademark
Dilution Law:A Remedy in Search ofa Harm, I6 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L. J. ol
(2oo6); Sara K. Stadler, The Wages of Ubiquity in TrademarkLaw, 88 IOWA L. REV. 731 (2003); Lars
S. Smith, Implementing a Registration System for Famous Trademarks, 93 'RADEMARK REP. 1097
(2003); Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, The Trademark Use Requirementin Dilution Cases,
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 541 (2oo8). But see Clarisa Long, Dilution, Io6
COLUM. L. REV. 1029 (2oo6); Shahar John Dillbary, Famous Trademarks andthe RationalBasis
for ProtectingIrrationalBeliefs, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 605 (2oo7); Barton Beebe, A Defense of
the New FederalTrademark Antidilution Law (Cardozo Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 175,
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strengthened in 2006.102
If non-famous within the meaning of section 43(c)(1) of the Lanham
Act, Qualitex's green-gold is not entitled to protection from dilution, and
can be infringed only by uses likely to be confusing to consumers, which
are generally understood to be uses of the same or similar mark, on the
same or similar (or "related") products, 103 which would be dry cleaning
pads and auxiliary dry cleaning goods or services. However, if a court found
it to be a "famous" mark, Qualitex would have cognizable dilution causes of
action against a broad range of uses of the color in contexts in which there
was no danger of consumer confusion. This is because dilution protection
gives trademark holders the ability to prevent use of the mark by others
in association with non-competing products in addition to traditional
protection against acts by competitors that might confuse consumers.
Delta Airlines, Delta Faucets and Delta Dental are three different
companies that peacefully coexist with the !same trademark. Dilution
doctrine says that once a company's trademark is famous, no one else can
use the mark for any trademark purpose. Assuming away the grandparent
provisions of the Lanham Act, this means that if the three companies had
been formed after the FTDA took effect, and Delta Faucets convinced a
court that it held a famous mark within the meaning of section 43 of the
Lanham Act, subsequent market entrants Delta Airlines and Delta Dental
would have to come up with alternative names for their companies. It is
understandable that Delta Faucet might prefer to be the sole commercial
user of Delta as a trademark, but it is not at all clear as a commercial matter
that they need to be. Traditional trademark protections never gave them a
doctrinal tool with which to accomplish this.
If a court deemed the green-gold mark famous within the meaning of
the Lanham Act,1°4 even uses of green-gold on disparate products such as
lawn mowers or bicycles could be held dilutive of Qualitex's color mark.
This would, however, restrict competition without a cognizable commercial
justification, however, and few jurists are likely to be convinced that Qualitex
earned this extensive a monopoly simply by using the color in connection
with dry cleaning products, even if the company dominates that market. It
may be that Qualitex's color mark would be unable to achieve "fame" no
matter how well recognized it was among consumers.
Concerns about according color marks dilution protection should not be
limited to Qualitex-type factual situations, either. Regardless of how well
advertised and culturally familiar a color mark is among the populace, no
judge who thinks through the ramifications of giving a trademark holder
2oo6), availableat http://ssrn.com/abstract=948576.
102 See Trademark Dilution Revision Act 2006,

H.R. Res. 683, io9th Cong.,
1730(2oo6).
103 See Beebe, supra note 70.
104 Lanham Act § 43 15 U.S.C.A § 1125 (1998 & Supp. 2oo8).

120

Stat.
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the power to control a color in the almost absolute sense that dilution
protections facilitate is going to be very enthusiastic about finding a color
mark famous. 105 This is because awarding dilution protection to any coloralone trademark could spark a rush of color-alone mark registrations by
companies fearful that unless they acted to preserve grandfathered rights
to manufacture products in particular colors, 116 they would be seriously
commercially disadvantaged in the future. That, in turn, would likely
rapidly foment color exhaustion in many market sectors. Large companies
would quickly become prohibitively constrained in the ways they could
trademark, package, and market their goods and services, and as chaos
ensued, there would be rebellion and backlash against dilution precepts.
Given dilution's popularity among well-funded mark holders, friction
around color-alone marks is unlikely to be enough to upend dilution laws
generally. It seems more likely that Qualitexcould be legislatively overruled,
and color-alone marks prohibited from registration on the principal registry
or enforcement generally. Or, the more moderate step of deeming coloralone marks ineligible for dilution protection would be taken. However,
the spectacle of Congress amending the dilution provisions of the Lanham
Act yet again might hopefully telegraph the unsoundness of the ill-advised
doctrine in a manner that contributes to its ultimate and much-hoped-for
(by this author, at least) demise. And if color-alone marks are effectively
ineligible for dilution protection regardless of fame, they are inherently
second class marks. Though this approach might preserve color availability
in the marketplace to an extent, it would further warp and confuse dilution
doctrine, and widen the divide between the statutory provisions in the
Lanham Act and what courts actually do.
CONCLUSION

Trademark rights are not supposed to interfere with competition based
on anything other than the commercial reputation of a product or service,
or of its source. Facilitating the registration and protection of color-alone
trademarks allows companies to lock up the aesthetic and communicative
105 See generally Robert G. Bone, A Skeptical View of the Trademark Dilution Revision Act,
INTELL. PROP. L. BULL. 187 (2007); Christine Haight Farley, Trademark Dilution Law: A Remedy

in Search of a Harm, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1oi (2oo6); Clarisa Long,
Dilution, Io6 COLUM. L. REV. 1029 (2OO6); Shahar John Dillbary, Famous Trademarks and the
Rational Basisfor Protecting IrrationalBeliefs, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 605 (2007); Shubguh
Ghosh, Dilution and Competition Norms: The Case of FederalTrademark Dilution Claims Against
Direct Competitors (SMU Dedman Sch. of Law Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 00-14,
2007), availableat http://ssrn.com/abstract= 10 12645. But see Beebe, supra note 99.
io6 When a mark is found to be famous and deserving of dilution protection, pre-existing
marks that are the same or similar but in use for unrelated goods or services (so they do not
infringe nor are not infringed by the now famous mark) receive the benefit of a grandparent
protection clause. Lanham Act § 43, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125 (1998 & Supp. 2008).
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attributes of color, and therefore inhibits legitimate competition, to the
detriment of consumers and would-be competitors alike. The approach
the Supreme Court took toward color-alone marks in Qualitex ignored these
important concerns, reflecting a "why not?" presumption about trademark
expansionism that is in direct conflict with longstanding pro-competition
jurisprudence of the Sears and Compco cases and their progeny.
Color-alone marks are fraught with uncertainty for competitors, as they
can be perceived differently across eyeballs, lighting schemes and contexts.
And the supply of commercially useful colors is fairly limited, especially
when one factors in a cushion to guard against potentially similar colors as
well as potentially confusing uses. The ability to compete on the basis of
aesthetic attributes is significantly compromised by the color-alone mark
regime.
Additionally, the virtually inherent functionality of color, especially
when it is a product feature, has been inadequately recognized or doctrinally
accommodated. Colors are almost always functional from a utilitarian,
aesthetic, or communicative perspective. The fact that they may also have
secondary meaning doesn't "cure" the problems that functionality poses
for trademark-ability, and any court that suggests otherwise is wrong as a
matter of law.
The use of colors can be simultaneously arbitrary and functional, which
can lead to confusion in courts smitten with the highly contestable view
that arbitrariness is a valuable trademark attribute that should be judicially
rewarded with extra vigorous protection. A sweatshirt can come in any
color. The selection of an orange one by an individual may be superficially
seen as an arbitrary choice. But maybe it is orange to make the wearer as
visible as possible. Or maybe it is orange to communicate an allegiance
to the Clemson Tigers, or to the University of Tennessee Volunteers. Or
possibly the wearer simply finds orange to be an attractive and appealing
color. None of these reasons have any innate trademark salience. Why
trademark laws should incentivize the use of arbitrary marks by giving
them enhanced doctrinal breath has never been cogently explained, and
unless and until it is, judges should decline to do this.
Tellingly, while companies enthusiastically register color-alone marks,
they never actually use color alone marks alone, unlike textual marks and
symbols. They recognize that on their own, colors are not perceived by
consumers as trademarks. Instead colors are interpreted as being functional
from a utilitarian perspective; or because they are aesthetically functional
and make a product or service more artistically or emotionally appealing; or
because they communicate useful information about the product or service
that is unrelated to its source. Color-alone marks can be used as effectively
to disadvantage competitors as to independently and singularly signify
sources.
Finally, it seems clear that if a court deemed a color-alone mark famous
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and subject to broad dilution protections, there would be a justifiable
backlash. The advisability of dilution protection is dubious enough when
accorded to non-coined textual marks, which can at least be avoided by the
use of synonyms. But there is no synonym or substitute, for example the
color green. The ability of one company to own a shade of green effectively
"in gross" would competitively disadvantage all other commercial entities
regardless of what goods or services they proffered in the marketplace.
The catastrophic anti-competitiveness that would follow according coloralone marks dilution protections illustrates the folly of dilution protection
generally. It isn't necessary, and ultimately all it may productively
accomplish is a "Full Employment Act" style enrichment of trademark
lawyers.

